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Seems to me that there is a massive amount of conceptual muddle going on in the various positions discussed. At best, the most conceptually clear (that is, most transparently limited with acknowledged status as holding frames for joint discussion) debate and research around bioevolutionary psychology tell us an awful lot about not very much, and almost nothing about an awful lot. debate and research around bioevolutionary psychology tell us an awfulWhat do you think could be the future of a 'science' that tells us an awful lot about not very much, and almost nothing about an awful lot? Sociology comes to mind. Personally, I think it could tell us what some might want it to tell us. Taking what I initially assumed to be the point of the clip first: although I am far from being a 'philosopher' in a narrow sense, my response is based on the fact that from a philosophical point of view evolutionary psychology does not add very much to our understanding of the wider questions of epistemology, ethics or aesthetics, although engaging with both it and the claims of philosophers who disagree with my view does provide for a clarification of the space between philosophy and science, and sharpens awareness of the ontological status of differing claims. Here I tend to the early Wittgenstein's critiques of social sciences' containing implicit logical errors at the core of their proj... I was referring more in terms of Huxley's take on personal enjoyment being the highest good, motivations involved in such pursuits, and the restructuring of society that diminishes the value of individuality. However, you said a mouthful and the best that I can tell (or comprehend) of your comment, it does not appear you hold credence in the potential of negative implications resulting from what can be apprehended in the pursuit of evolutionary psychology, through mostly subjective means. Namely - "an awful lot about not very much, and almost nothing about an awful lot." As far as it goes, however, I welcome the investigation and am not opposed on ideological grounds. My point is that the... We more or less agree, I think, on the essential point. But as you may infer, I believe that in the right context 'materialist reductionism' is ok as a scientific method within a temporary holding frame, and is not on the same logical level as what I understand you to mean by idealism, so is not in contradiction. The problem arises when the two are seen as being equivalent (equal-valued, occupying the same logical space) in competing for certain claims (and this is one of the foci of the Stanford article). A logical confusion here may lead to proposing one as contradicting the other, or one as more valid than the other, both of which positions reflecting psychological rather than logical claims. Very well said, abailart. I do not disagree with your last comment at all. |
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