All politicains SUCK. All of them. But, since Clinton's name was brought up, I'll throw a card down for all to see: It's called Presidential Directve #60 enacted by one William Jefferson Clinton in November 1997.
Here's the link:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm

Here's an excerpt of that text:
"The new guidance also continues the policy that the U.S. will not rely on "launch on warning," but will maintain the capability to respond promptly to any attack, thus complicating an adversary's calculations. However, the new guidance eliminates previous Cold War rhetoric including references to "winning a protracted nuclear war."

"The Clinton administration quietly made a signific...

All politicains SUCK. All of them. But, since Clinton's name was brought up, I'll throw a card down for all to see: It's called Presidential Directve #60 enacted by one William Jefferson Clinton in November 1997.
Here's the link:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm

Here's an excerpt of that text:
"The new guidance also continues the policy that the U.S. will not rely on "launch on warning," but will maintain the capability to respond promptly to any attack, thus complicating an adversary's calculations. However, the new guidance eliminates previous Cold War rhetoric including references to "winning a protracted nuclear war."

"The Clinton administration quietly made a significant change in the U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine in November by formally abandoning guidelines issued by the Reagan administration in 1981 that the United States must be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war... [Robert] Bell [Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council] emphasized that 'there is no change in this PDD with respect to U.S. policy on launch on warning and that policy is that we do not, not rely on it.' In fact, Bell said 'in this PDD we direct our military forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not rely on launch on warning—to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence... Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating,' he said."

"Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine" in "Arms Control Today" November/December 1997
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_11-12/pdd.asp

My problem with nuclear weapons is that regardless of whatever "policies" are in place, humanity is not mature enough, responsible or smart enough to use them. People have been plenty good at killing hundreds of thousands of other people for millenia without the aid of long-lasting, super-powerful nuclear weapons. Rolling Thunder, Dresden, Iwo Jima, and the bombings of London in WWII are all just the most famous examples of such. I feel no safer with the United States having nuclear arms than I do with the idea of Iran having them.

@The Real Napster
The United States still ostensibly has a policy of not attacking until attacked, too. Everything's wishy-washy or completely prone to being...

My problem with nuclear weapons is that regardless of whatever "policies" are in place, humanity is not mature enough, responsible or smart enough to use them. People have been plenty good at killing hundreds of thousands of other people for millenia without the aid of long-lasting, super-powerful nuclear weapons. Rolling Thunder, Dresden, Iwo Jima, and the bombings of London in WWII are all just the most famous examples of such. I feel no safer with the United States having nuclear arms than I do with the idea of Iran having them.

@The Real Napster
The United States still ostensibly has a policy of not attacking until attacked, too. Everything's wishy-washy or completely prone to being dissolved.

Anyway, this article is actually about Halliburton being a rotten company. They shouldn't've supplied the nuclear what-have-yous to Iran.

While no general I DO know that submarines (and even silos) cannot launch on their own. They need the launch order from guess who? The commander in chief. If the commander in chief is vaporized in a first wave attack, then it follows the chain of command. While everyone is still reeling from the first nuke hit, the second, and even third wave can come in, while so-called experts are trying to verify what just happened.

Meanwhile the subs are still submerged and haven't gotten word yet of what has happened. Like I said, if you take the first strike in nuclear war, odds are high you are going to lose. The attacking nation doesn't lose if your missiles never get the order to launch in...

While no general I DO know that submarines (and even silos) cannot launch on their own. They need the launch order from guess who? The commander in chief. If the commander in chief is vaporized in a first wave attack, then it follows the chain of command. While everyone is still reeling from the first nuke hit, the second, and even third wave can come in, while so-called experts are trying to verify what just happened.

Meanwhile the subs are still submerged and haven't gotten word yet of what has happened. Like I said, if you take the first strike in nuclear war, odds are high you are going to lose. The attacking nation doesn't lose if your missiles never get the order to launch in time to make any difference. When Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked the Japanese didn't even beleive it at first, as communications were sparse and few. Bottom line- One nuclear bomb can and will ruin your whole day.

I now return you to your Bush=Cheney bashing crusade.

This is 2007 not 1945. There are reciprocal defense agreements with allies to launch nuclear attacks if we are attacked. You just don't get it, no one wins. If anybody is still alive they are probably wishing they had died. NO ONE WINS!

One drawback of this doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early warning systems are notoriously error-prone. On 78 occasions in 1979, for example, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections potentially threatening to the North American continent. Some of these were trivial errors, spotted quickly. But several went to more serious levels. For example, on 26 September 1...

This is 2007 not 1945. There are reciprocal defense agreements with allies to launch nuclear attacks if we are attacked. You just don't get it, no one wins. If anybody is still alive they are probably wishing they had died. NO ONE WINS!

One drawback of this doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early warning systems are notoriously error-prone. On 78 occasions in 1979, for example, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections potentially threatening to the North American continent. Some of these were trivial errors, spotted quickly. But several went to more serious levels. For example, on 26 September 1983, Stanislav Petrov received convincing indications of a US first strike launch against the USSR - but had the instinct that it was a computer error and, contrary to his orders, sat on his hands. Similar incidents happened many times in the US, due to failed computer chips, flights of geese, test programs, bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military men of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. And for many years, US strategic bombers were kept airborne on a rotating basis round the clock until the sheer number and gravity of accidents persuaded policymakers it was not worth it. - Link

That is why it is extremely important not to launch on warning only. Systems fail, systems have glitches and it is more than likely that the Russian system is more likely to fail then ours is and I don't want them launching on "warning only". GET IT?