Solving the cllimate crisis with game theory


	Solving the cllimate crisis with game theory

alexpapa

10-1-2007 5:30 PM

666 views

tags:

climate, climate change, kyoto, game theory, decisions, negotiations, treaty, prisoner's dilemma

alexpapa says:

This article provides an interesting perspective on the current dynamics of paralysis in the way the international community deals with climate change. It also offers pretty interesting and practical actions that could help break the deadlock and start moving towards measurable improvements in the way we use the global environment.

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